The other Joe.
by Chaddens on Feb 14, 2007 1:54 PM EST
45 comments
Joe Nathan is underrated. Well, to those outside of Minnesota, he is underrated and seeminly not appreciated. Over on ESPN's Hot Stove Heaters (http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/hotstove06/columns/story?id=2763130), they are going through a bunch of different stories. Yesterday was the Bullpen. The Twins was 6th in the Majors according to Sean McAdam.
In there, it contained the following line about about the Angels Bullpen (#3):
"Francisco Rodriguez has led the American League in saves in each of the last two seasons and boasts a ridiculous strikeout ratio (189 in the last 140 1/3 innings). "
Joe Nathan, in his last 138 1/3 innings has the same amount of strikeouts. It confused me how they don't give him more credit. Another line is (and this is an amazing stat to me even though I've seen most of the these blowns saves) that he has only blown 10 saves in the last three years!! K-Rod hs blown 16, Mo Rivera 11 (153 1/3 IP with 135K the last two years), Wagner 12 and Ryan 9 (in just the last two years).
It's scary to see how much he could get on the free agent market - Wagner got paid 10.5 million last year (albeit from the other NY team) and BJ Ryan got an average of nearly 9.5 million - if Terry Ryan doesn't get something done. He's younger than Mo, Wagner and only a year older than BJ Ryan.
What kind of contract should he expect? I would think that Ryan really can't backload it due to Joe being 36/37 at the end of 4/5 year contract to coincide with the new stadium. However, he hsn't shown any signs of slowing down and has been (knock on wood) very healthy since the team picked him up. Also, Neshek, Durbin or Crain could be groomed for the job...
Would he give Minny a home town discount since they rescued him from SF and made him into a closer where he'll be making a lot more money than he ever would of as a middle reliever?
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Nathan is the one high profile star
He's been a terrific asset, but on the assumption that the Twins can't keep everyone, he's of the least long-term value to this franchise, and is the one most likely to command a salary that significantly outstrips his value (by dint of his position).
by Eric in Madison on Feb 14, 2007 4:15 PM EST reply actions 0 recs
I'm fine...
This isn't like when the Twins let Guardado and Hawkins walk--Nathan is significantly better than those two.
by ubelmann on Feb 14, 2007 4:28 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
I agree
Still and all, I would not resign him for market rates, such as they are. So '09 could be an interesting year in the ninth inning. I don't think any of the current crop of set-up guys could close consistently (at least any better than Eddie G. [pass the nitro]). And the minors is full of great starter prospects, but few closer prospects. The closest thing I see is Morlan, who will pitch in Fort Myers this year. That puts his ETA at 2010, and then only in a set-up role. It's this kind of assessment that leads the Twins to considering signing Nathan to an extension. I just don't see how they can afford him with all the other stars on this team.
by cmathewson on Feb 14, 2007 4:58 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
One misconception:
That is not true. No one who has seriously studied this believes that.
I personally don't buy the argument that the closer role can be manned by an above average set-up guy.
Isn't that exactly who Joe Nathan was before the Twins acquired him? Or Eddie Guardado?
Closers in the postseason for recent World Series champs:
Adam Wainwright
Bobby Jenks
Keith Foulke
Ugeth Urbina
Those guys aren't elite closers. Those guys are good relief pitchers who didn't suffer as a result of moving to the closer's role. Yes, there is a psychological aspect to pitching the ninth inning, but you are never going to know who can do it until you give them the chance. There are plenty of pitchers who can pitch just as well in the ninth as in any other inning.
You might not see who the next good closer for the Twins is going to be, but that doesn't mean he isn't hanging around for Rick Anderson or some scout in the organization to see. If there's anything the Twins have done well in this decade, they've put together one of the best bullpens in all of baseball and they've never made a big free agent acquisition to do so.
Hell, look at J.J. Putz, who took over for Guardado last year. He was a completely nondescript reliever until this year, added a sick splitter in the offseason and became a dominant, elite-level closer. If you find enough promising arms, throw them against the wall and see who sticks (essentially what Ozzie Guillen did in Chicago during their WS year) you can do just fine for yourself.
The only thing you need to do to win a World Series is to make the playoffs and win 11 games. How you choose to do that is partly a matter of style and partly a matter of luck. You can do it with OR without an elite closer, though.
by ubelmann on Feb 14, 2007 6:28 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
James
I was watching a program on the Science Channel on Sabermetrics and Bill James himself said, "We have studied this issue and determined that the ninth inning is no more important or difficult to get outs in than any other inning." The point he was trying to make, which many GMs have accepted (e.g., Beane, Shapiro, Epstein) is that the closer role is not nearly as important as the market indicates. In fact, any good set-up man ought to be able to do it fine.
I realize sometimes he says things to get a charge out of people, but we have witnessed first hand that some set-up men do not make it as closers but all closers make it as set-up men. So the "throw the guy out there in the ninth and see if he can handle it" theory is risky at best. In fact, on our own team, it cost us a shot at the playoffs in 2001. And if I analyzed this, I could find 10 teams since 2000 who have missed a shot at the playoffs because they lost too many games after the eighth inning.
The Twins have lost a grand total of one game in which they led after eight innings since Joe Nathan took over. Analysts are puzzled as to why the Twins perennially overachieve. Nathan is a big reason.
by cmathewson on Feb 14, 2007 11:00 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Yeah
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 14, 2007 11:04 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Then he's full of crap...
Then he's full of crap or you're remembering him incorrectly. Some people might not believe it's more difficult, but it's certainly more important. There's a difference.
In fact, on our own team, it cost us a shot at the playoffs in 2001.
Because they decided to throw Hawkins in the fire instead of Guardado? Tell me, when LaTroy was firing off the Twins record long successfully completed save streak to start a career were you out there saying that Guardado was the one with the stones and that LaTroy couldn't handle it? Please. Hawkins was 1.5 wins below replacement level while making $1.45M that year. The Twins finished 6 games out of first. You need to look at more than him if you want to explain the gap between the Twins and the Indians that year.
No one is born a closer. You either have to come straight from the minors or you have to come from being a set-up man. So you can pick your poison: overpay someone with a name on the free agent market, choose from the options on hand, or bring someone straight from the minors into the role.
You can get around the risk if you have a $200M payroll and can afford to pay your closer whatever it takes. But when you have a $70M payroll, there's as much risk in overpaying a proven guy and letting other areas suffer as there is in putting in someone who isn't proven.
When Nathan (who is an elite closer) goes out on the market, he's going to get at least a 5-year deal for about $55-65M. On a $120M payroll, I'd gladly pay him that. On an $80M payroll already crowded with 2-3 guys who demand superstar salaries? That's a mighty tough decision.
by ubelmann on Feb 15, 2007 12:49 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
I didn't say
And you're using revisionist history when talking about Hawk. He got that streak through smoke and mirrors. When his luck finally ran out, he blew at least eight save opportunities, many of which were the three-run-lead-and-nobody-out-to-start-the-inning variety. He was not the only cause of the team's collapse (losing your top two hitters--one to trade and one to injury--at the same time sure didn't help). But if he has an average save percentage, the Twins are in the race for the division title in late September. His performance was a big reason for not having a shot at the playoffs in September. By the time they put Guardado in the role, the Twins were effectively playing for 2002.
Guardado was also shaky, but he did not blow a lot of saves.
As for James, he did say it. And I have heard him quoted as having that opinion by guys like Neyer, Beane, and Epstein. Go back and read the stuff. It's in there. That's why Beane signed life-long set-up guy Arthur Rhodes to close in 2005. And he was proven wrong and had to scramble with a rookie. It turned out OK long term, but it cost him a shot at the playoffs.
I agree James's full of crap. Outs are harder to get the later in the game because the opposition bears down when hitters' backs are to the wall. That's precisely why some set-up men don't make it as closers. The jump from set-up man to closer is like the jump from AAA to the majors. You can dominate in the eighth, but it requires another level of focus and command to dominate in the ninth. Some set-up guys like Guardado can get through with guile and heart while blowing 15 percent of their save opportunities. But few pitchers in baseball are capable of dominating in the ninth.
by cmathewson on Feb 15, 2007 9:43 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
oh really?
If it's true that outs are harder to come by in the 9th because hitters "bear down" then, I would say it's the hitters who are full of crap! They should be bearing down in th 7th or 8th! Or the 1st, or 4th, or the whole game, because nobody checks what inning a run scored in when they add them up at the end. If this is true, then coaches should be training hitters to bear down MORE in early innings before the other team puts their closer in.
Even if you could show me that outs are worth more in the 9th, I would still expect to find that closers are way overpaid. The extreme premium on preventing 9th inning runs means you could probably save 8 million a year on a non-elite closer who might blow a few saves, but prevent ten times as many runs by spending it on middle relievvers.
True, some of those runs might occur in games that were already decided. But if the game IS decided in the 7th because you skimped on middle relief, having a 10-million-dollar closer isn't going to help you. Teams should try to pile on runs early and make the closer moot. It's not like basketball, where refs keep the game close and let teams decide it in the last five minutes. A run is a run is a run, and if you dig yourself a hole, you have to dig your way back out. All runs are worth the same.
I do remember the whole discussion about that stat showing performance in game-changing situations, and that Nathan scored huge. And I agree a good era in mop-up situations doesn't mean nearly as much as Nathan kicking ass when the game is on the line. I'm just saying, look at how much Nathan sat on the bench early last season because there was nothing he could do by the 9th. Scoring and preventing runs early decided those games, even if they didn't happen in pressure situations, and teams should focus on those innings just as much.
I would love to see the Twins pay Nathan a bundle for one or two more years, if a championship is within reach in 2008 and 2009. (Considering we just gave them a no-strings-attached $300M gift, spending a bit of that on the team would be a nice gesture.) But if I had to cut $10 million somewhere, which I expect we will, I think the drop-off from great to good at closer would probably be the most palatable place to take the hit.
It would be interesting to see the wins above replacement numbers for Nathan vs. Torii. I had assumed Torii should be first to go, but I don't know who actually contributes more to wins. Torii will be older in a year though, and demand a longer contract, so probably he would go first. Probably both, but I think the Twins are more serious about going after Nathan than Torii, and that's fine with me, if only because of age and length of contract. Nathan probably has a better shot at being an elite player in three or four years than Torii, though who really knows.
by by jiminy on Feb 15, 2007 10:43 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Just to clarify
I agree with you about Nathan's value. On a championship team, a closer is worth every penny. But on a team like we threw out there early last year, he won't get enough chances to earn his pay. If I was rebuilding, the first thing to go would be the closer 'cause the market will give you the most bang for your buck. But as long as I had aspirations for a championship, I would retain my closer. That's why it's folly to me to trade Nathan at this time, especially before next year, when I think we will have the best team in Twins history (on paper anyway).
The only risk in signing him to a long-term deal is health. As long as he stays healthy, we could always trade him if for some reason we fall out of contention. And our return would likely be more than it would be if he was allowed to leave for free agency after the '08 season.
by cmathewson on Feb 15, 2007 11:34 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
The 9th
The big difference between outs in the 9th/sometimes 8th and regular outs in teh 7t, etc, is your team has few, perhaps no, chances to make up for any deficits created then. If an average middle reliever comes in and gives up to runs to go down by one in the 6th or 7th, your chances of winning don't drop as much since you still have a couple innings to turn it around. If a closer loses the lead, the game may be over right there, or at least you'll now have to score runs off the OTHER team's shutdown closing ace, so your chances are much diminished. That's why shutting a team down in the ninth is more important than any other inning, even though a run is a run is a run. This is one area statistics have struggled.
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 15, 2007 10:54 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
perception vs reality
But I suspect that this perception of the game being decided in the ninth is at least in part a logical fallacy. Yes, it really is your last chance to overcome that one-run deficit your middle reliever saddled you with. It appears the game is being decided now. But you would not have to be overcoming that one-run deficit if he hadn't given up those runs in the 6th, would you? Which really decided the game? I still maintain all runs count equally toward the final results.
Suppose we accept that it is the 9th inning that decides the game, because there are no more chances to alter the outcome after the ninth. By that logic, isn't it really the last batter alone who decides the game? And isn't it really then the last pitch that decides the game? It's the exact same logic, but the logical fallacy starts to become apparent.
The end of a game is played under a magnifying glass, but it's the perception of decisiveness that is magnified, not the actual effect on the outcome. If a sprinter has a bad start, then spends the rest of the race steadily gaining on the leader but can't catch up, did the winner succeed because he held him off at the end, even though the man was gaining on him, or because he jumped to a lead? The same logic could apply here, that the end was decisive. But here I would not say that all points in the race count as much as the end; here, I would actually say the beginning is what won it. In the end, the winnder was actually running slower than the loser. The beginning is where he most significantly out-performed him, and where he disproportionately earned the victory.
So why doesn't that logic apply to baseball? If Your closer saves a one-zero victory in the 9th, did he do the most important thing? Why not say the game was one when that runs scored? Which of course the pitcher had no hand in -- meaning that all 9 innings of shut-out pitching were equally important, as a failure in any one of them would have cost the lead.
I personally think closing is overvalued. It may be the hardest inning because the perception of importance requires a pitcher to handle pressure better, but you need to give a closer a lead for him to be worth anything, so you could make a case the starter and middle reliever were if anything more important in deciding the game by creating the lead the closer protects. Yes if the closer blows the lead, he blows the game. But if the starter or middle reliever blows the game, the closer has no impact at all -- zero. The closer can render the previous pitchers moot if he blows a lead they created, but they can render him moot by blowing a lead he can no longer protect.
So where you say, "This is one area statistics have struggled," I would argue that the reason statistics struggle to validate our clear perceptions is that our perceptions are wrong and statistics are right.
I think the overvaluation of closers is an inefficiency in the market that smart, moneyball-type GMs should exploit (which is exactly what Billy Beane does). I'm not saying closers aren't important, or even disproportionately important, if only because the outsize influence on team and fan morale that losing a game in the 9th has as opposed to losing one in the 5th. But to just win games, money would be invested more efficintely in people who prevent runs in less visible innings, thereby deciding games when no one is paying as much attention.
by by jiminy on Feb 19, 2007 1:12 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Half
I think the overvaluation of closers is an inefficiency in the market that smart, moneyball-type GMs should exploit (which is exactly what Billy Beane does).
Several moneyball GM's, including Beane (who actually, if you consider this, has long made sure to have a closer) and Epsteain (who is a money-ball style GM with the added luxury of signing a couple guys to big deals, currently Ramirez, Ortiz, Schilling, and D-Mat) have tested the limits of this clsoer theory, that all innings are created equal, and have failed most spectacularly and publicly.
Also, everything you said is true. The hinge of your point is a run is a run. This is true, but it is only half the story. A team with a lead doesn't necessarily work the same way to score runs that a team behind does. From the perspective of your chance to win the game, which is measured statistically by, say, win percentage, a late inning lead blown hurts worse. If a lead of one run is turned to a one run deficit in the top on the seventh, your win chances go from maybe 65% to 35%. Bad, but palatable, or more so. If you lose the same lead in the top of the ninth, your win chances go from something like 90% to 10%. Not so good anymore. So on one hand you have all runs being equal, but on the other hand you have a bigger effect on your team's chances to win a game. The two must be balanced evenly.
The other side of the issue, to which statheads (WHICH I GENERALLY AM) generally ultimately respond with a grunt of air and a "well, that's stupid" or "well people shouldn't think that way," is a team is much more demoralized by the late losses. late crushing losses, especially in big games, have a way of really deflating a team and doing far more damage than just won game in the loss column. Go no further than a couple specific games in 2001 to see this VERY REAL element of sports (the psychology, as in the fact that humans with minds, that make up at least three-quarters of the play and control the body, especially in a game as governed by judgment as baseball, are the ones playing) in full display.
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 19, 2007 10:30 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Leverage
The most apt analogy I can come up with right now is a football analogy: all turnovers are not created equally. If you turn the ball over in the red zone, it's much more costly than turning the ball over at midfield, because you're more likely to be giving away or giving up points as a direct result of the play. Similarly, if you give up the lead in the first inning, your team still has plenty of chances to make up for that, whereas if you give up the lead in the ninth inning, sometimes you don't get any chance to recover. That is to say, an average team recovers from an N run deficit in the 1st inning more often than an average team with an N run deficit in the 8th inning.
So yes, in some sense all runs count equally, but there's still a very real sense in which close situations at the end of a game are more important than close situations at the beginning of a game.
I'd agree that the psychological difference between the 8th and the 9th or the 7th and 8th is overstated and that smart GMs (like Terry Ryan!) have exploited this inefficiency by not bothering to pay top dollar for a "proven" closer.
by ubelmann on Feb 19, 2007 11:22 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Not harder...
Look, Arthur Rhodes struggled to close for the A's because he wasn't very good, not because he didn't have the magic beans to pitch the ninth inning. The difference in his performance in '03 and '04 is insignificant given the number of innings that he pitched. He was a 34-year old reliever who was moved out of an extreme pitcher's park (certainly the best place to pitch for a left-handed pitcher in the AL) and into a fairly neutral park in Oakland. So he allowed a couple more HR, and took another step back in his control. You don't need some weird closer mojo theory to talk explain his performance in '05.
When his luck finally ran out, he blew at least eight save opportunities, many of which were the three-run-lead-and-nobody-out-to-start-the-inning variety.
There were four times in '01 where Hawkins gave up 3 or more runs. Once was a blown save on Aug. 14th where he gave up the tying three runs in the ninth in a game the Twins eventually lost. Another was the 8th inning on August 17th when the Twins were down 6-1.
On August 8th, the Twins were tied going into the 10th with the Indians, but TK wanted to stick with Wells going into the 10th. Wells allowed a single, which quickly turned into runners on first and second with one out. Hawkins was brought in to face Juan Gonzalez (hitting .325/.370/.590 this year--compare to Justin Morneau at .321/.375/.559 last year), he gave up a double and otherwise fell apart.
On July 29th, Hawkins gave up four runs in the 8th inning when the Twins were down 6-2.
So in reality, Hawkins blew ONE three-run-lead-and-nobody-out-to-start-the-inning save opportunity the entire season, and really pitched just as poorly (if not worse) in non-save situations than he did in save situations. Revisionist history indeed.
And before you talked about me using revisionist history, I should have reminded you that I remember that Hawkins struggled to close the door during his streak, but while it was going on everyone was like "whatever, he's still getting the job done and that's all that matters." In fact, people said the same things about Guardado the entire time he was closing. Should the Twins have pulled Guardado as their closer halfway through 2002 because things got interesting every now and then? By your line of thinking, we don't know that a closer can't handle the role until he actually starts blowing saves. The Twins followed your logic.
LaTroy Hawkins' best years as a pitcher exactly coincided with having Rick Anderson as his pitching coach. You say the 9th inning was his nemesis, I say he needed Rick Anderson to guide him. Neither one of us can prove the other wrong.
You think that the 9th is a completely different beast than the 8th and I think you're blowing things way out of proportion. It's different, but it's not that different, and every season pitchers who weren't closers before turn out to be adequate closers. There are more guys in the league who can handle that job than you want to admit.
by ubelmann on Feb 15, 2007 1:43 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Difference
I think to reiterate my point, pitching in the 9th is a different beast because the cost of failure, both in emotional cost and mathematical chance of winning, is much greater in the 9th, so you want a guy that fails as little as possible, preferably much less than a typical, even good, middle reliever. That the added pressure makes some players worse for the difference is just another difficulty of finding a new closer. Do we have a guy in our bullpen now that I believe could handle the job pretty well? Between Neshek, Crain, and Rincon, I'd say hell ya. But those guys would fail way more often than Nathan, because they have in the past in their current roles, and those failures would be much more damaging and painful than their older failures.
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 15, 2007 2:20 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
psychological margin
And for some reason I feel the need to bring up Mitch Williams and the different pitcher he became after Joe Carter's home run.
by doofus04 on Feb 16, 2007 2:34 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
But
But, as I said, the difference is the price of failure is far worse in the ninth. You blow a lead in the ninth and your team is pretty screwed and disappointed. You blow a lead in the 7th and you still have some chances to come back and it is more palatable, so you want a guy out there who really gets it done.
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 16, 2007 3:58 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Yes
by cmathewson on Feb 16, 2007 4:36 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
I think
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 18, 2007 8:29 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Alrightee then
And every year pitchers who were not closers but were good middle relievers turn out not to be able to do the job. That was my point, which I repeat for the third time. It is risky to try a set-up man as a closer. Some will do just fine. Some will be shaky at best. Some will totally fall apart. The smallest percentage will dominate as Nathan has.
At some point, every team has to take that risk. The question is, when is a reasonable time for the Twins? My answer is, it depends on how they do in 2008. But it can't hurt much to sign him to a below-market extension now 'cause they can always trade him.
LaTroy Hawkins' best years as a pitcher exactly coincided with having Rick Anderson as his pitching coach. You say the 9th inning was his nemesis, I say he needed Rick Anderson to guide him. Neither one of us can prove the other wrong.
Well, he was an above average pitcher in 2000, when he primarily pitched in long relief, and he was above average in 2004 and 2005. Interestingly, his best years were his 29th, 30th, and 31st years. He struggled mightily until his 27th year. He had two years on either side of his peak in which he was above average. And he appeared to regress mightily last year in his 34th year. In short, his age/performance curve is about normal.
As you say, we will not convince each other of the one cause of Hawkins' meltdown in 2001. It is probably a combination of things. But his age/performance bell curve does have one major blip, and that was the second half of 2001, when he was asked to close for a first-place team. Anderson helped him in 2002, but so did having less pressure.
As for Rhodes, he was a premier set-up man prior to Beane choosing him as a closer. It surprised a lot of smart talent evaluators that he couldn't at least hold his own, a la Eddie G. He couldn't for many of the same reasons Hawkins couldn't. The pressure of the ninth got to him. That is the risk you take when designating a set-up guy as a closer.
by cmathewson on Feb 15, 2007 3:02 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Anyone who tells you that...
by ubelmann on Feb 15, 2007 3:17 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Really?
Stat 2004----2005
H/9 8.83----10.71
BB/9 3.00----4.89
ERA 4.17----5.12
WHIP 1.31---1.73
The only number that did not change was his strikeout rate.
Prior to 2005, his 2004 year was the worst of his career. Prior to that, you're looking at ERAs in the 2s and 3s.
by cmathewson on Feb 15, 2007 3:40 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Correction and one more thing
Lest you think it was just an age thing, these are the same numbers from his 2005 year with Cleveland:
H/9 6.85
BB/9 2.49
ERA 2.08
WHIP 1.04
by cmathewson on Feb 15, 2007 4:31 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
And he was getting older...
Let's look at it closely. Since it's a pretty small sample anyway, it helps to average things out by total batters faced rather than innings pitched. Also, we'll throw out intentional walks from his walks total (and batters faced) since those are generally in the pitcher's favor (as opposed to most unintentional walks).
2003:
SO/TBF - 0.212
BB/TBF - 0.071
HR/TBF - 0.018
In 2004 he faced 178 batters that weren't intentionally walked. Here are the number of strikeouts, walks, and home runs we would expect given his '03 rates (Ex2003) and his actual 2004 performance.
Ex2003 2004 Diff
SO 37.8 34 -3.8
BB 12.6 17 +4.4
HR 3.2 9 +5.8
So when it comes down to it, you're looking at 4 fewer strikeouts, 4-5 more walks, and 6 more HR before we even start adjusting for the fact that it's easier to pitch in Safeco as a LHP than in Oakland as a LHP.
When the number of events is that small, it's not that hard for me to ascribe the differences in '03 and '04 to aging, park effects, and some bad luck. It's cliche, but there's little difference between a warning track fly ball and a home run. In '04 Rhodes essentially had a few warning track fly balls become home runs. It sucks if you're an A's fan, but it's not as though they should have expected him to be a whole lot better.
I honestly don't see much difference in his '03, '04, and '05 performances. A few strikeouts here, a few home runs there, it's easy for results to vary when you're talking about 40-50 innings pitched.
by ubelmann on Feb 15, 2007 5:46 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Wow
I'm no A's fan, but I can be pretty sure that Billy Beane did not bail on his season and admit to taking a bath on his signing while rushing a rookie closer without being pretty disappointed in how Rhodes pitched. In other words, he expected Rhodes to pitch like he had in Seattle and Rhodes did not live up to those expectations. Beane is not one to rely on anything but numbers when comparing expected performance with reality . So perhaps he sliced the numbers differently than you.
You managed to prove to me that you can slice and dice the numbers and explain away any differences--or emphasize them--to prove any point you want. That's the kind of analysis that causes the so-called purists to reject sabermetrics. Rather than letting the numbers dictate the opinions you should have, you form your opinions and make the numbers conform to them.
by cmathewson on Feb 15, 2007 6:23 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Look...
I'm no A's fan, but I can be pretty sure that Billy Beane did not bail on his season and admit to taking a bath on his signing while rushing a rookie closer without being pretty disappointed in how Rhodes pitched.
You've got your facts all confused here. In 2004, Beane traded for Octavio Dotel to replace Rhodes as closer. Regardless of how you evaluate Rhodes, you ought to think that Dotel was the better pitcher at the time. Beane wasn't "bailing"--he was upgrading.
SO/TBF BB/TBF HR/TBF
Dotel '03 0.282 0.084 0.026
Dotel '04 0.350 0.075 0.037
Rhodes '03 0.212 0.071 0.018
Rhodes '04 0.191 0.096 0.051
Now if we want to see if there's a significant difference between Rhodes' '03 and Dotel's '03, we can do the same thing I did for Rhodes '03 and '04 by looking at the raw differences we would expect over 178 batters faced:
Dotel03 Rhodes03 Diff
SO 50.2 37.7 +12.5
BB 15.0 12.6 +2.4
HR 4.6 3.2 +1.4
Now consider that as a reliever, Dotel won't ever be facing a pitcher in the NL, Houston is a hitter's park, Seattle being a great place for LHP, and Dotel was about 4 years younger. That's the minimum difference, and 12 strikeouts is pretty big to begin with, even if he gives a little back in BB and HR. And halfway through '04, Dotel had continued to pitch well while Rhodes hadn't done as well. It was clear that Beane was upgrading when he replaced Rhodes with Dotel, even if you think (as I do) that Rhodes' '04 wasn't that different from his '03.
Like any good GM, Beane saw a weakness in his club, saw an opportunity to upgrade that weakness, and he took advantage of that opportunity. He had to give up Mark Teahan to do it, but Teahan was a ways away at that point and he was blocked (and still would be blocked) by Eric Chavez anyway.
Beane also knew that he wasn't taking that big of a risk on Rhodes because if Rhodes didn't do well that season, Beane could always move him to another team looking for a lefty bullpen arm, and sure enough, he was able to do that.
And when Beane moved on to Huston Street in '05, it's not like he was taking a significant risk. His stats in college were great, and the scouts liked him. Baseball America, while ranking him the A's second best pitching prospect (behind Joe Blanton) in '04 said:
"Huston Street and Jairo Garcia are both closer-worthy and ready to contribute in 2005."
Street has been better over the last two years than Dotel or Rhodes were in '03 anyway.
by ubelmann on Feb 15, 2007 7:28 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Sorry about that
Oakland has often been considered a pitcher's park. I know that's somewhat changed since they built the spaceship in center field for Al Davis, but all that foul territory... It's not just some fantasy of mine. Rhodes himself was quoted as saying he wanted the chance initially, but he just couldn't handle it. And Beane had no plans to acquire Dotel until after Rhodes fell apart. He certainly didn't want to give up more talent after spending his entire closer budget on Rhodes. Then there's Rhodes' stellar performance in Cleveland the year after. I thought it was a pretty clear-cut case. So for you to argue it tooth and nail just floored me.
And what's the point anyway? We both agree that some successful set-up guys fail as closers, right? You have to look cross-eyed at the numbers to deny that it ever happens. So why is it such a big deal to you that one guy who has never donned a Twins' uniform failed as a closer? It's not some paradigm case argument. You can't be arguing that no set-up guys fail as closers. We only disagree on the number of guys who fail and the degree of their failure--shades of gray to which there will be no reconciling, as you readily admit.
by cmathewson on Feb 15, 2007 10:44 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
It's a matter of what....
In my statistics class a few years back, we did an exercise. Half the class flipped coins and recorded the results. The other half was told to make up a sequence that looked random. Without exception, the professor was able to tell which results were actual coin flips and which results weren't. Why? Because the actual coin flips contained more long sequences of consecutive heads (or consecutive tails) than the human generated tallies.
In my experience, people are very quick to see some difference in numbers and find a way to explain it, while underestimating the possibility that a large part of that difference (though maybe not all of it) is due to chance.
So no, I don't care that much about Arthur Rhodes, and yes, some set-up men fail as closers. But some of those set-up men that fail as closers would have failed in any role they had. Yet, every time someone fails as closer the story has to be about the pressure. It's not always the case that the pressure is the biggest factor, and it gets old to hear that song and dance over and over and over again.
by ubelmann on Feb 16, 2007 4:36 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Oakland
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 15, 2007 10:04 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Safeco Field is a big pitcher's park...
So if you're a lefty pitcher, and you already naturally have an advantage over left-handed batters, then pitching in Safeco is basically the best place you can pitch.
and the skyrocket in the home run totals
It's SIX home runs! Look, apparently I'm on an island here, but even if we were talking about flipping coins here, those sorts of fluctuations happen. But add into that not only statistical variance, but systematic variance from the particular teams and hitters and field conditions, and six just isn't a big number under those circumstances.
I can't look at Rhodes' numbers going into '03 and say that I feel '04 is some huge setback. He had a rough year, but his performance isn't that different from what someone could've predicted going into the season.
by ubelmann on Feb 16, 2007 4:23 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
6
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 16, 2007 1:45 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
I read...
These next two to four years are probably going to be a bit of a transformation for Nathan. An extension, yes, I'd love to see it, but not for 4 years.
by Jesse on Feb 14, 2007 4:23 PM EST reply actions 0 recs
I like Nathan, but...
However, I also believe that you pay a premium for the "closer" reputation, and I don't think that it's as cost-effective, compared to the money you can save by plugging in another quality reliever. I think Neshek or Rincon (just to name a couple of examples on the Twins) could do an acceptable job in the closer role, and they'll cost a lot less because they don't have many career saves.
I know all Twins fans are petrified of another LaTroy Hawkins debacle, but I think situations like that are the exception, not the rule.
by BeefMaster on Feb 14, 2007 5:10 PM EST reply actions 0 recs
Also...
by cmathewson on Feb 14, 2007 11:13 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Ohh Yah
by anderson800 on Feb 15, 2007 3:32 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Hasn't shown signs of slowing
by TMoney on Feb 14, 2007 5:13 PM EST reply actions 0 recs
Nathan
I'd maybe like to see a coupl eyear extension reached, even at high price so we could trade him THEN. I wouldn't trade him before 08 though. That will be quite a team.
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 14, 2007 8:30 PM EST reply actions 0 recs
ESPN
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 14, 2007 8:35 PM EST reply actions 0 recs
Hot Stove Series
In fact, if you would have read the first two paragraphs in the division column, their purpose is spelled out
"The eternal debate over who's hot and who's not is driven by an even more maddening question: What, exactly, is the definition of hot?
In identifying baseball's hottest division, do we mean the trendiest (most attractive to free agents), the most talented (greatest star quotient) or the most competitive (tightest races)?"
But it was still great how they made a point of K-Rod's K-rate over the last two years and didn't bring up that Nathan's was better.
by TMoney on Feb 14, 2007 9:29 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Well
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 14, 2007 9:45 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
variation
by TMoney on Feb 14, 2007 9:51 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
A couple
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 14, 2007 9:59 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Ya...
As for Nathan, I agree, we need him for 2008 because we are going to have an absolutely SICK team then. I wouldn't mind a 2-3 year extension, but Nathan, as much as I love the guy, should be the very last guy on our list of extensions right now (after Santana, Cuddyer, Morneau, Hunter, in that order).
by djskilbr on Feb 14, 2007 11:57 PM EST up reply actions 0 recs
Beltran
by AdamOnFirst on Feb 15, 2007 12:12 AM EST up reply actions 0 recs
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